I will address those two frameworks, and the objections that they generate, in Sections 2 and 3, illustrating the persistence of the three philosophical problems presented above. Discussion of repatriation in general, and in the philosophical literature in particular, is typically framed in the context of two related issues: cultural property and reparations for historical injustices. I begin by briefly outlining some of the most significant objections that have been presented against claims for repatriation. Beyond defending against objections to repatriation, this argument yields the surprising conclusion that the redistribution of cultural resources should be much more radical than is typically supposed. I demonstrate this by arguing that a response to the historical injustices of illicit art and artifact acquisition can be fruitfully embedded in a broader concern with pursuing a just distribution of cultural goods. I argue that the third objection can be met head-on, while the first two can be effectively sidestepped. In this article, I attempt to avoid all three of these objections. Finally, even if these first two challenges can be met, there are objections that question whether museums have an obligation to repatriate at all, especially given countervailing considerations concerning their institutional mission. Second, there are epistemic challenges according to which limitations on our knowledge of the conditions under which objects were acquired render the justice of their acquisition unclear, potentially undermining the legitimacy of claims for repatriation. First, there are metaphysical challenges concerning the continuity of cultural groups over time, which pose problems for determining to whom objects should be repatriated. Objections to repatriation can be divided into roughly three kinds. However, there is a substantial literature spanning philosophy, law, and anthropology that explores the moral complications of the repatriation proposal. According to claims like these, museums have a moral obligation to repatriate questionably acquired objects from their collections. For instance, consider claims for the return of the Benin Bronzes, pillaged from the Benin Kingdom during the British Punitive Expedition of 1897, or the abundance of claims for the return of Native American cultural items that led to the passage of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act in 1990. Should these injustices be rectified, and if so, how? Some argue that there are objects in museum collections that should be repatriated, returned to their country, culture, or owner of origin. Some were stolen or plundered, others acquired through coerced or exploitative transactions. Some of these objects have made their way to these institutions through unjust means. The Metropolitan Museum of Art alone holds two million objects. Museums are home to millions of artworks and cultural artifacts. However, in this paper, I argue that some of the very considerations museums appeal to in order to oppose repatriation claims can be turned on their heads and marshaled in favor of the practice. In addition to defending against objections to repatriation, this argument yields the surprising conclusion that the redistribution of cultural goods should be much more radical than is typically supposed. In particular, repatriation, even if justified, is often portrayed as contrary to the aims and values of museums. However, these arguments face a series of philosophical challenges. Some argue that these objects should be repatriated (i.e., returned to their country, culture, or owner of origin). Museums are home to millions of artworks and cultural artifacts, some of which have made their way to these institutions through unjust means.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |